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GUN CONTROL AND  





The federal power over criminal law has no counterpart in the United States or 
Australia, where criminal law is a state responsibility. This power has enabled the 
Parliament of Canada to enact a national Criminal Code1 as well as some other 
statutes that criminalize dangerous or deceptive behaviour. Early attempts to use 
the power as a tool to regulate the insurance industry2 or prices generally3 were 
rebuffed by the Privy Council, although their Lordships did use the power to 
uphold a primitive form of federal competition law in which the sole mode of 
enforcement was the criminal prosecution.4 
Those who dream of an increased regulatory presence for the Parliament of 
Canada have not in the past usually nominated the criminal-law power as a likely 
source of that presence — outside the conventional domain of criminal law. The 
difficulty was that the cases established that a valid criminal law had to take the 
form of a prohibition coupled with a penalty in support of a “typically criminal” 
purpose.5 These three requirements severely limited the topics upon which criminal 
law could be enacted, and the legislative techniques that could be employed. In the 
last six years, however, three decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have 
upheld rather bold uses of the criminal-law power in such diverse areas as tobacco 
advertising, environmental protection and gun control. 
_______________________________________________________________ 

  Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. This paper was originally presented at the 
April 6, 2001 conference entitled “2000 Constitutional Cases: Fourth Annual Analysis of the 
Constitutional Decisions of the S.C.C.” sponsored by the Professional Development Program at Osgoode 
Hall Law School. Adapted by permission of Carswell Publishing from a paper entitled “The Expansion 
of the Federal Power over Criminal Law,” to be published in 2002 by Carswell in Mélanges Gérald-A. 
Beaudoin/Essays in Honour of Gérald-A. Beaudoin. 
1
  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
2 Ontario (Attorney General) v. Reciprocal Insurers, [1924] A.C. 328 (P.C.). 
3
 Reference re Board of Commerce Act, 1919 (Canada), [1922] 1 A.C. 1910 (P.C.). 
4
 Proprietary Articles Trade Assn. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1931] A.C. 310 (P.C.). 
5 Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1951] A.C.  
179 (P.C.). 
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II. TOBACCO 
The first decision is RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General),6 in 
which the Supreme Court of Canada had to review the validity of the federal 
Tobacco Products Control Act,7 which prohibited the advertising of cigarettes and 
other tobacco products. It was clear that the criminal-law power permitted 
Parliament to prohibit the manufacture, sale or possession of dangerous products. 
But Parliament had not done that: the manufacture, sale and possession of tobacco 
remained lawful and all that was prohibited was the advertising of tobacco 
products. Advertising itself was not a dangerous act, and the advertising of 
consumer goods was normally within the jurisdiction of the provinces under their 
power over property and civil rights.8 In the Supreme Court of Canada, Major J.’s 
dissenting view was that the prohibition of the advertising of a legal product lacked 
a typically criminal purpose and was outside the criminal-law power. La Forest J. 
for the majority disagreed. In his view, the power to prohibit the use of tobacco on 
account of its harmful effects on health also encompassed the power to take the 
lesser step of prohibiting the advertising of tobacco products. Although it was 
impracticable to ban the product itself in view of the large number of Canadians 
who were smokers, the ban on advertising still pursued the same underlying public 
purpose of protecting the public from a dangerous product. The majority of the 
Court therefore held that the Act was within the criminal-law power of Parliament. 
(The Act was actually struck down by a majority of the Court under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,9 because of the impact of the advertising ban on 
freedom of expression.) 
III. ENVIRONMENT 
The second of the three cases is R. v. Hydro-Québec,10 in which the Supreme 
Court of Canada upheld the Canadian Environmental Protection Act,11 which is a 
federal law that establishes a scheme for the regulation of toxic substances. The 
Ministers of Environment and Health have authority to examine the effects of any 
substance and to recommend to the Governor in Council that the substance be 
classified as “toxic,” which involves a finding that the substance is harmful to the 
_______________________________________________________________ 
6
 [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199. On the criminal-law power, La Forest J. wrote the majority opinion with the 
support of six other members of the Court; Major J. dissented on this issue with the support of Sopinka J.  
7
  R.S.C. 1985, c. 14 (4th Supp.) [rep. S.C. 1997, c. 13, s. 64]. 
8
 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927. 
9
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
10
 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213. The majority opinion was written by La Forest J. with the agreement of 
L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory and McLachlin JJ. The dissenting opinion was written by Lamer C.J.C. 
and Iacobucci J. with the agreement of Sopinka and Major JJ. 
11
  R.S.C. 1985, c. 16 (4th Supp.) [repealed and replaced by S.C. 1999, c. 33]. 
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environment or a danger to human health. Once classified as toxic, the substance 
comes under the regulatory authority of the Governor in Council, which may make 
regulations governing its release into the environment, and the manner and 
conditions under which it can be manufactured, imported, processed, transported, 
stored, sold, used and discarded. Hydro-Québec was prosecuted for violating an 
“interim order” authorized by the Act. The corporation argued that the Act, and 
therefore the interim order, was outside the criminal-law power of the federal 
Parliament.  
The corporation’s argument was accepted by Lamer C.J.C. and Iacobucci J., 
who wrote for the four dissenting judges. In their view, although the protection of 
the environment was a legitimate purpose for a criminal law, this Act lacked the 
prohibitory character of a criminal law. There was no prohibition until the 
administrative process to classify the substance (or to make an interim order) had 
been completed, and “[i]t would be an odd crime whose definition was made 
entirely dependent on the discretion of the Executive.”12 The dissenters were also 
troubled by a provision of the Act that exempted a province from a regulation if 
that province already had an equivalent law in place; that, said Lamer C.J.C. and 
Iacobucci J., “would be a very unusual provision for a criminal law.”13 But La 
Forest J., writing for the majority, upheld the Act as a criminal law. In his view, 
because the administrative procedure for assessing the toxicity of substances 
culminated in a prohibition enforced by a penal sanction, the scheme was 
sufficiently prohibitory. He characterized the exemption for provinces with 
equivalent provincial laws as recognizing the reality that much of the field of 
environmental protection is effectively concurrent. In the end, then, the Act was 
upheld as a criminal law. 
IV. GUN CONTROL 
The third of the three cases is Reference re Firearms Act (Canada),14 in which a 
challenge was mounted to Canada’s gun control legislation, which is part of the 
Criminal Code. The main techniques of control consist of requirements to register 
all firearms and to license all firearms owners. The Supreme Court of Canada held 
that the purpose of gun control was public safety, which was a typically criminal 
purpose. The purpose was ultimately effected by a prohibition of unregistered guns 
and unlicensed holders, and the prohibition was backed by penalties. The 
opponents of gun control argued that the Act was regulatory rather than criminal 
legislation, because of the complexity of the regime and the discretionary powers 
_______________________________________________________________ 
12
 R. v. Hydro-Québec, supra, note 10, at para. 55. 
13
 Id., at para. 57. 
14
 [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783. The unanimous opinion was the opinion of “the Court.” 
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vested in the licensing and registration authorities. Only an outright prohibition of 
guns, it was argued, would be a valid criminal law. The Court relied on its prior 
decision in Hydro-Québec for the proposition that the criminal-law power 
authorizes complex legislation, including discretionary administrative authority. 
And the Court relied on its prior decision in RJR-MacDonald for the proposition 
that a criminal purpose may be pursued by indirect means. Just as the health risks 
of tobacco did not require the outright banning of cigarettes, the safety risks of 
guns did not require the outright banning of guns. Measures that would indirectly 
advance the legislative purpose, such as the advertising ban in RJR-MacDonald or 
the licensing and registration requirements of the gun control legislation, were 
authorized by the criminal-law power. 
V. CONCLUSION 
These three decisions take the criminal-law power well beyond the conventional 
limits of criminal law. The first case (RJR-MacDonald) shows that even a harmless 
activity (advertising in that case) can be regulated, provided it is in the ultimate 
service of preventing a harmful activity. The second case (Hydro-Québec) shows 
that harm to the environment, not necessarily harm to persons or property, can 
serve  
as a sufficient purpose to justify criminal law, and leaves the door open to other 
kinds of harms as well. The second and third cases (Hydro- 
Québec and Firearms) show that regimes of regulation with elaborate regulatory 
structures and official decision-making can be upheld as criminal law, although 
they are a far cry from the model of a law that is self-applied by the individuals to 
whom it applies and is enforced only by police, prosecutors and the criminal 
courts. The conclusion is that much more can be done with the criminal-law power 
than we imagined 50 years ago, or even 10 years ago. 
